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Windows server 2012 r2 不断蓝屏并自动重启 RRS feed

  • 问题

  • 您好:

    本次遇到的蓝屏信息如下:

    Your PC ran into a problem and needs to restart. You cansend into Microsoft about what went wrong to help us improve Windows.

    Files that will be sent to Microsoft:

    C:\Windows\Minidump\

    C:\User\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp

    C:\Windows\MEMORY.DMP

    需提交的三个文件的网盘链接(链接:https://pan.baidu.com/s/1hsKuguwApf9FQKsxyeXeHQ 

    提取码:89ag)

    请问怎么解决,谢谢!


    2020年6月18日 2:01

全部回复

  • *******************************************************************************

    *                                                                             *

    *                        Bugcheck Analysis                                    *

    *                                                                             *

    *******************************************************************************

    IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL (a)

    An attempt was made to access a pageable (or completely invalid) address at an

    interrupt request level (IRQL) that is too high.  This is usually

    caused by drivers using improper addresses.

    If a kernel debugger is available get the stack backtrace.

    Arguments:

    Arg1: 0000000000000000, memory referenced

    Arg2: 0000000000000002, IRQL

    Arg3: 0000000000000000, bitfield :

             bit 0 : value 0 = read operation, 1 = write operation

             bit 3 : value 0 = not an execute operation, 1 = execute operation (only on chips which support this level of status)

    Arg4: fffff802f80af0da, address which referenced memory

    Debugging Details:
    ------------------
    
    
    
    
    KEY_VALUES_STRING: 1
    
    
        Key  : Analysis.CPU.Sec
        Value: 3
    
    
        Key  : Analysis.DebugAnalysisProvider.CPP
        Value: Create: 8007007e on VCECHE548VM
    
    
        Key  : Analysis.DebugData
        Value: CreateObject
    
    
        Key  : Analysis.DebugModel
        Value: CreateObject
    
    
        Key  : Analysis.Elapsed.Sec
        Value: 28
    
    
        Key  : Analysis.Memory.CommitPeak.Mb
        Value: 70
    
    
        Key  : Analysis.System
        Value: CreateObject
    
    
    
    
    ADDITIONAL_XML: 1
    
    
    BUGCHECK_CODE:  a
    
    
    BUGCHECK_P1: 0
    
    
    BUGCHECK_P2: 2
    
    
    BUGCHECK_P3: 0
    
    
    BUGCHECK_P4: fffff802f80af0da
    
    
    READ_ADDRESS:  0000000000000000 
    
    
    PROCESS_NAME:  System
    
    
    TRAP_FRAME:  fffff802f98a9120 -- (.trap 0xfffff802f98a9120)
    NOTE: The trap frame does not contain all registers.
    Some register values may be zeroed or incorrect.
    rax=ffffffffffdff120 rbx=0000000000000000 rcx=0000000000000000
    rdx=ffffe00007190020 rsi=0000000000000000 rdi=0000000000000000
    rip=fffff802f80af0da rsp=fffff802f98a92b0 rbp=fffff802f8355a80
     r8=ffffe00007190020  r9=0000000000000088 r10=ffffe0000526d0a0
    r11=fffff802f98a9650 r12=0000000000000000 r13=0000000000000000
    r14=0000000000000000 r15=0000000000000000
    iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
    nt!KeInsertQueue+0x82:
    fffff802`f80af0da 483901          cmp     qword ptr [rcx],rax ds:00000000`00000000=????????????????
    Resetting default scope
    
    
    STACK_TEXT:  
    fffff802`f98a8fd8 fffff802`f81687e9 : 00000000`0000000a 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000000 : nt!KeBugCheckEx
    fffff802`f98a8fe0 fffff802`f816703a : 00000000`00000000 ffffffff`ffdff108 00000000`00000200 fffff802`f98a9120 : nt!KiBugCheckDispatch+0x69
    fffff802`f98a9120 fffff802`f80af0da : ffffe000`04b22040 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 ffffe000`021bfb00 : nt!KiPageFault+0x23a
    fffff802`f98a92b0 fffff800`020d5a4a : ffffe000`00000000 ffffe000`032f863a ffffe000`0526d020 ffffe000`068ab300 : nt!KeInsertQueue+0x82
    fffff802`f98a9330 fffff800`01f24d22 : ffffe000`068ab300 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000088 00000000`00000088 : srv!SrvReceiveHandler+0x2c1
    fffff802`f98a9380 fffff800`01f2583d : ffffe000`00000004 fffff802`f98a9650 fffff802`00000004 00000000`00000004 : srvnet!SrvNetCommonReceiveHandler+0x102
    fffff802`f98a94b0 fffff800`0174bd2c : fffff802`f98a97d1 00000000`0000000e 00000000`00000000 ffffe166`2abfb668 : srvnet!SrvNetWskReceiveEvent+0x23d
    fffff802`f98a97a0 fffff800`00ede1d5 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : afd!WskProTLEVENTReceive+0xdc
    fffff802`f98a9870 fffff800`00eb7b4c : ffffe000`06b56460 ffffe000`06b565b8 fffff800`017674b0 ffffe000`06b56460 : tcpip!TcpIndicateData+0x15a
    fffff802`f98a9990 fffff800`00eba08b : ffffe000`02155701 ffffe000`06b56520 fffff780`00000008 ffffe000`06b56460 : tcpip!TcpDeliverDataToClient+0x2ac
    fffff802`f98a9b10 fffff800`00edb875 : ffffe000`32c5bd01 ffffe000`63b8b520 ffffe000`032f7436 ffffe000`032f743b : tcpip!TcpDeliverReceive+0xab
    fffff802`f98a9c10 fffff800`00ebaa10 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 ffffe000`ffffffff fffff802`f98a9eb0 : tcpip!TcpTcbFastDatagram+0x245
    fffff802`f98a9e60 fffff800`00f09707 : ffffe000`052158e1 ffffe000`0382f001 ffffe000`033fb010 ffffe000`02024960 : tcpip!TcpTcbReceive+0x160
    fffff802`f98a9fb0 fffff800`00eb9ba5 : ffffe000`032f8622 ffffe000`03608000 00000000`00000000 ffffe000`02155730 : tcpip!TcpMatchReceive+0x1e7
    fffff802`f98aa140 fffff800`00ebdf3f : ffffe000`021c5220 fffff802`f98aa469 fffff802`f98abd01 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!TcpPreValidatedReceive+0x385
    fffff802`f98aa240 fffff800`00ebe243 : ffffe000`05cf3400 00001fff`fa30cfd8 ffffe000`04aa0ac0 fffff800`003ba930 : tcpip!IppDeliverListToProtocol+0x4f
    fffff802`f98aa300 fffff800`00ed377c : ffffe000`05f5c330 00000000`00000000 ffffe000`033fb010 fffff802`f98aa408 : tcpip!IppProcessDeliverList+0x63
    fffff802`f98aa3a0 fffff800`00ed0a1a : fffff802`f98aa530 ffffe000`032dedf0 ffffe000`03608000 00000000`00000001 : tcpip!IppReceiveHeaderBatch+0x1fc
    fffff802`f98aa4d0 fffff800`00ed017c : ffffe000`033fed90 00000000`00000000 fffff802`f98aa801 fffff800`006f1f00 : tcpip!IppFlcReceivePacketsCore+0x68a
    fffff802`f98aa850 fffff800`00ecfe15 : ffffe000`033f0002 00000000`00000000 fffff800`00ecf5e0 00000000`00000001 : tcpip!FlpReceiveNonPreValidatedNetBufferListChain+0x31c
    fffff802`f98aa930 fffff802`f80e76c9 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 ffffe000`0363f210 fffff802`f98a5000 : tcpip!FlReceiveNetBufferListChainCalloutRoutine+0x155
    fffff802`f98aaa60 fffff800`00ecf596 : fffff800`00ecfcc0 fffff802`f98aabe0 00000000`00000010 ffffe000`0167b018 : nt!KeExpandKernelStackAndCalloutInternal+0xe9
    fffff802`f98aabb0 fffff800`006efcde : 00000000`00000000 fffff802`f98aac91 ffffe000`00000001 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!FlReceiveNetBufferListChain+0xb6
    fffff802`f98aac30 fffff800`006f045d : 00000000`00000002 ffffe000`02990008 ffffe000`00000000 ffffe000`00000001 : NDIS!ndisMIndicateNetBufferListsToOpen+0x11e
    fffff802`f98aacf0 fffff800`01989231 : 00001fff`f9dd9fd8 ffffe000`02998000 fffff802`f98aaf08 fffff800`01980cee : NDIS!NdisMIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x32d
    fffff802`f98aaee0 fffff800`01989b9e : ffffe000`02998000 00000000`000003d6 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000000 : b57nd60a+0x54231
    fffff802`f98aaf30 fffff800`01946ad2 : 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000000 ffffe000`02998000 fffff800`00000000 : b57nd60a+0x54b9e
    fffff802`f98ab000 fffff800`01947b5f : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000001 fffff802`00000011 : b57nd60a+0x11ad2
    fffff802`f98ab050 fffff800`01948750 : ffffe000`02998000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 fffff800`01947810 : b57nd60a+0x12b5f
    fffff802`f98ab0b0 fffff800`006ee702 : fffff802`f98ab1b9 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 ffffe000`016351a0 : b57nd60a+0x13750
    fffff802`f98ab0f0 fffff802`f808e840 : fffff802`f98ab3a0 ffffe000`019fd568 fffff802`f82fd180 ffffe000`019fd250 : NDIS!ndisInterruptDpc+0x1b2
    fffff802`f98ab220 fffff802`f808e520 : ffffe000`00000000 00001f80`00000000 00000000`0000005b 00000000`00000002 : nt!KiExecuteAllDpcs+0x1b0
    fffff802`f98ab370 fffff802`f81607ea : fffff802`f82fd180 fffff802`f82fd180 00000000`001a3fe0 fffff802`f8355a80 : nt!KiRetireDpcList+0xd0
    fffff802`f98ab4e0 00000000`00000000 : fffff802`f98ac000 fffff802`f98a5000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!KiIdleLoop+0x5a
    
    
    
    
    SYMBOL_NAME:  srvnet!SrvNetCommonReceiveHandler+102
    
    
    MODULE_NAME: srvnet
    IMAGE_NAME:  srvnet.sys
    
    
    STACK_COMMAND:  .thread ; .cxr ; kb
    
    
    BUCKET_ID_FUNC_OFFSET:  102
    
    
    FAILURE_BUCKET_ID:  AV_srvnet!SrvNetCommonReceiveHandler
    
    
    OS_VERSION:  8.1.9600.16404
    
    
    BUILDLAB_STR:  winblue_gdr
    
    
    OSPLATFORM_TYPE:  x64
    
    
    OSNAME:  Windows 8.1
    
    
    FAILURE_ID_HASH:  {bae4754f-e989-0937-9658-bd274956cbca}
    
    
    Followup:     MachineOwner

    ---------

    您好,可以检查最新的系统补丁做一个更新。

    如果回答是有帮助的, 请将其标记为答案, 可以帮助其他有相同问题的社区成员, 并快速找到有用的答复。



    针对Windows 2008/2008R2的扩展支持将于2020年结束,之后微软将不再为其提供安全更新。点击此处或扫描二维码获取《在 Azure 上运行 Windows Server 的终极指南》,把握良机完成云迁移并实现业务现代化。

    2020年6月18日 6:47
  • 您好,

    通过windbg 工具打开MEMORY.DMP得到结果如下:

    SYMBOL_NAME:  nt_wrong_symbols!52341CF4781000

    STACK_COMMAND:  .thread ; .cxr ; kb

    EXCEPTION_CODE_STR:  52341CF4

    EXCEPTION_STR:  WRONG_SYMBOLS

    PROCESS_NAME:  ntoskrnl.wrong.symbols.exe

    IMAGE_NAME:  ntoskrnl.wrong.symbols.exe

    MODULE_NAME: nt_wrong_symbols

    FAILURE_BUCKET_ID:  WRONG_SYMBOLS_X64_9600.16404.amd64fre.winblue_gdr.130913-2141_TIMESTAMP_130914-082316_52341CF4_nt_wrong_symbols!52341CF4781000

    OS_VERSION:  8.1.9600.16404

    BUILDLAB_STR:  winblue_gdr

    OSPLATFORM_TYPE:  x64

    OSNAME:  Windows 8.1

    FAILURE_ID_HASH:  {22198cf8-592a-b9e1-7d73-4f84dc1bf882}

    Followup:     MachineOwner
    ---------

    请问还是适用更新修复方法吗?

    2020年6月18日 7:30
  • 您好,

    根据您提供的信息,IMAGE_NAME:  ntoskrnl.wrong.symbols.exe,这是您的symbol文件配置出现问题,导致无法分析出更具体有帮助的信息。您可以在microsoft store 中下载Windbg Preview工具对dump进行分析。

    我们依然建议您首先对系统进行更新。请在更新过后检查问题是否会复现。

    如果问题依然存在,建议您使用MemTest64工具对内存先进行一个检测,工具下载链接为:https://www.techpowerup.com/memtest64/

    如果回答是有帮助的, 请将其标记为答案, 可以帮助其他有相同问题的社区成员, 并快速找到有用的答复。



    针对Windows 2008/2008R2的扩展支持将于2020年结束,之后微软将不再为其提供安全更新。点击此处或扫描二维码获取《在 Azure 上运行 Windows Server 的终极指南》,把握良机完成云迁移并实现业务现代化。

    2020年6月19日 1:42
  • 您好,

    系统已更新,并已联系DELL服务器供应商确认服务器硬件无故障;

    服务器还是会出现重启现象,清协助,谢谢!

    2020年6月28日 5:48
  • 您好:

    另外查看系统错误日志得到以下信息,是否有帮助?

    日志名称:          System
    来源:            Microsoft-Windows-WER-SystemErrorReporting
    日期:            2020/6/28 7:09:52
    事件 ID:         1001
    任务类别:          无
    级别:            错误
    关键字:           经典
    用户:            暂缺
    计算机:           SRV-ACTIA
    描述:
    计算机已经从检测错误后重新启动。检测错误: 0x00000019 (0x0000000000000003, 0xffffe000077fc010, 0x000000000000ffff, 0xffffe000077fc010)。已将转储的数据保存在: C:\Windows\MEMORY.DMP。报告 ID: 062820-20359-01。
    事件 Xml:
    <Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event">
      <System>
        <Provider Name="Microsoft-Windows-WER-SystemErrorReporting" Guid="{ABCE23E7-DE45-4366-8631-84FA6C525952}" EventSourceName="BugCheck" />
        <EventID Qualifiers="16384">1001</EventID>
        <Version>0</Version>
        <Level>2</Level>
        <Task>0</Task>
        <Opcode>0</Opcode>
        <Keywords>0x80000000000000</Keywords>
        <TimeCreated SystemTime="2020-06-27T23:09:52.000000000Z" />
        <EventRecordID>14409</EventRecordID>
        <Correlation />
        <Execution ProcessID="0" ThreadID="0" />
        <Channel>System</Channel>
        <Computer>SRV-ACTIA</Computer>
        <Security />
      </System>
      <EventData>
        <Data Name="param1">0x00000019 (0x0000000000000003, 0xffffe000077fc010, 0x000000000000ffff, 0xffffe000077fc010)</Data>
        <Data Name="param2">C:\Windows\MEMORY.DMP</Data>
        <Data Name="param3">062820-20359-01</Data>
      </EventData>
    </Event>

    2020年6月28日 6:12
  • 您好,

    请您尝试停用网卡驱动的节能模式,同时去官网下载更新网卡驱动。

    同时请在设备管理器中检查是否有出现感叹号标识的或者是需要更新的驱动,如果有的话,请做更新。

    另外建议您尝试禁用安全软件后使用干净启动,查看蓝屏问题是否还会发生。

    如何使用干净启动:

    https://support.microsoft.com/zh-cn/help/929135/how-to-perform-a-clean-boot-in-windows

    如果回答是有帮助的, 请将其标记为答案, 可以帮助其他有相同问题的社区成员, 并快速找到有用的答复。


    针对Windows 2008/2008R2的扩展支持将于2020年结束,之后微软将不再为其提供安全更新。点击此处或扫描二维码获取《在 Azure 上运行 Windows Server 的终极指南》,把握良机完成云迁移并实现业务现代化。

    2020年7月2日 2:49